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Abstract
Economic theories of legal compliance emphasize legal sanctions, while psycho-
logical and sociological theories stress the perceived legitimacy of law. Without
disputing the importance of either mechanism, we test a third way that law af-
fects behavior, an expressive theory that claims law influences behavior by cre-
ating a focal point around which individuals coordinate. The focal point theory
makes three claims: (1) that the need for coordination is pervasive because “mixed
motive” games involving coordination model common disputes; (2) that, in such
games, any third-party cheap talk that calls the players’ attention to a particu-
lar equilibrium tends to produce that equilibrium; and (3) that law, by publicly
endorsing a particular equilibrium, tends to call the players’ attention to that out-
come. After explaining the first and third claim, we offer an experimental test of
the second. Specifically, we investigated how various forms of third party cheap
talk influence the behavior of subjects in a Hawk/Dove or Chicken game. De-
spite the players’ conflicting interests, we found that messages highlighting one
equilibrium tend to produce that outcome. This result emerged when the message
was selected by an overtly random, mechanical process, and also when it was de-
livered by a third-party subject; the latter effect was significantly stronger than
the former only when the subject speaker was selected by a merit-based process.
These results suggest that, in certain circumstances, law generates compliance not
only by sanctions and legitimacy, but also by facilitating coordination around a
focal outcome.
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ABSTRACT 
 Economic theories of legal compliance emphasize legal sanctions, while psychological 
and sociological theories stress the perceived legitimacy of law. Without disputing the 
importance of either mechanism, we test a third way that law affects behavior, an expressive 
theory that claims law influences behavior by creating a focal point around which individuals 
coordinate. The focal point theory makes three claims: (1) that the need for coordination is 
pervasive because “mixed motive” games involving coordination model common disputes; (2) 
that, in such games, any third-party cheap talk that calls the players’ attention to a particular 
equilibrium tends to produce that equilibrium; and (3) that law, by publicly endorsing a particular 
equilibrium, tends to call the players’ attention to that outcome. After explaining the first and 
third claim, we offer an experimental test of the second. Specifically, we investigated how 
various forms of third party cheap talk influence the behavior of subjects in a Hawk/Dove or 
Chicken game. Despite the players’ conflicting interests, we found that messages highlighting 
one equilibrium tend to produce that outcome. This result emerged when the message was 
selected by an overtly random, mechanical process, and also when it was delivered by a third-
party subject; the latter effect was significantly stronger than the former only when the subject 
speaker was selected by a merit-based process. These results suggest that, in certain 
circumstances, law generates compliance not only by sanctions and legitimacy, but also by 
facilitating coordination around a focal outcome. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Chwe (2001) explains social rituals by their ability to generate the common knowledge 
needed to solve a coordination game. He gives many examples of how rituals work as “common 
knowledge generators,” including those that publicize the power and authority of the state. But 
Chwe omits what we think is one of the more interesting examples of his theory: the ritual of 
law. While law-and-economics theorists tend to view law as facilitating cooperation, we believe 
that another important but neglected function of law is to generate the common knowledge 
necessary for individuals to coordinate. Because of the publicity commonly given to and 
expected for law, legal pronouncements can create common knowledge about governmental 
expectations. Even aside from the sanctions government may use to enforce its expectations, the 
mere knowledge of legal pronouncements will often create a “focal point” that influences the 
behavior of individuals in a coordination game. Broadcasting the legal rule “drive on the right,” 
for example, is likely to prompt compliance independent of the threat of legal sanctions. 
It is exceedingly easy to overlook this coordinating power of law. One reason is that two 
other explanations have long dominated theory and empiricism on the subject of legal 
compliance. Most economic analysis assumes that sanctions are the sole mechanism by which 
law achieves compliance (via deterrence or incapacitation), while most psychological and 
sociological theories emphasize the perceived legitimacy of law as the primary explanation for 
compliance (via social and institutional reinforcement of moral norms). The debate between 
these camps obscures the possibility of any alternative. In addition, the common joinder of law 
with sanctions and legitimacy makes it extraordinarily difficult to discern whether law has a 
power independent of these forces. Finally, even if one is prepared to look beyond the two 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art29
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prevailing theories, the problem of coordinating among multiple equilibria stands a bit outside 
the mainstream of game theory that is applied to law. Indeed, many law-and-economics scholars 
think of coordination as relevant to only a narrow domain of social life that does not include the 
conflict that law seeks to resolve. 
Despite this resistance, a few theorists have offered coordination as another mechanism 
for generating legal compliance, a third reason why people obey the law (Cooter 1998; Hay & 
Shleifer 1998, p.400-401; Lessig 1995, p.1016; Posner 2000, p.177-79; McAdams 2001a). These 
coordination explanations employ rational choice tools, and, like other economic theories, avoid 
complex notions of legitimacy. Despite these differences from psychological and sociological 
approaches, however, coordination theories similarly conclude that law can generate some 
compliance expressively, apart from its sanctions.1 Without denying the power of sanctions or 
legitimacy, the coordination explanation claims that law influences behavior independently of 
either.  
There has, however, been little empirical testing of these novel theories. Though several 
experiments document the power of recommendations in “conflict-free” coordination games 
(where subjects agree on what equilibrium is best), law commonly addresses coordination 
situations with genuine conflict (where subjects rank the equilibria differently). There has been 
almost no testing of the claim that mere “cheap talk” from third parties can influence behavior in 
such games. To remedy this gap, we conducted an experiment to examine whether and how 
cheap talk messages influence play in a Hawk/Dove Game. Here, we present our findings, which 
                                                           
1
 There are also rational choice explanations of the expressive power of law that do not rely on coordination. E.g. 
Dharmapala & McAdams 2003; Funk 2002; Kahan 2000; McAdams 2000b. And, of course, there are theories of the 
law’s expressive effect that do not rely on rational choice. See Nadler 2002, Robinson & Darley 1997, Sunstein 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
  4 
support the claim that third-party expression can by itself influence behavior in coordination 
situations that model legal disputes. We emphasize two points about the relationship of the 
current study to the larger topic of legal compliance. First, by testing an expressive theory, we do 
not imply a rejection of compliance theories that emphasize sanctions or legitimacy. Second, by 
testing a coordination theory, we do not imply a rejection of other expressive theories. Indeed, we 
identify below the limited domain in which coordination theories apply. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II sets forth the coordination explanation of 
expressive law, particularly the “focal point” theory. Section III reviews the relevant empirical 
literature on the subject. Section IV describes our experiment. Section V concludes. 
II. COORDINATION THEORIES OF EXPRESSIVE LAW 
A. Background on Coordination Games and Focal Points 
Coordination theories of expressive law apply only in situations of multiple equilibria. 
Most law-and-economics analysis considers the problem of multiple equilibria only as it arises in 
iterated versions of the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. But the need to coordinate among multiple 
equilibria is more general. A common illustration of a pure coordination game is the choice 
between driving on the left or right side of the road. There are two pure strategy equilibria with 
identical payoffs – where everyone drives on the left and where everyone drives on the right. But 
the fact that all individuals share some interest in avoiding the non-coordinated outcome – where 
some drive left and others right – does not guarantee coordination. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1996. 
Games with multiple equilibria provide a useful context for studying expressive effects 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art29
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because, by definition, a player’s choice of strategy is not fully determined by the payoffs. 
Instead, Schelling (1960) observed that any feature of a coordination equilibrium that draws 
attention to itself, making it “stand out” among the equilibria, will tend to produce self-fulfilling 
expectations that this salient equilibrium will result. Players tend to select an equilibrium that is 
“unique” in some non-payoff dimension merely because that uniqueness, when sufficiently plain, 
causes each player to expect every player to focus on it. For example, Schelling asked New 
Haven residents to name the place and time they would meet someone in New York City on a 
given day, if they had failed to communicate more specifically on the subject. Though there is an 
extremely large number of possibilities, over half the individuals named the same place – Grand 
Central Station – and almost everyone named the same time – noon. Later experiments confirm 
that, where nothing in the mathematical structure of the game favors any single outcome, a non-
payoff feature that makes one equilibrium psychologically “focal” tends to cause individuals to 
choose the strategy that produces that equilibrium. (See Mehta et al. 1994). 
In pure coordination games, the simplest way to create a focal point is by communication 
and agreement. Many experiments demonstrate that the players can increase their level of 
coordination in such games by engaging in “cheap talk”: costless, non-binding, and non-
verifiable communication. (Crawford 1998 provides a review.) Schelling (1960), however, was 
interested in cases where the individuals could not communicate and/or could not agree. In such 
cases, he claimed, a third party could create a focal point merely by suggesting a possible 
solution. His example of third-party influence in a pure coordination game was a prominent sign 
posted throughout a department store that suggests where lost parties should reunite. Even 
though parties may not have agreed in advance to follow the sign’s suggestion, we can imagine 
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that, once lost, they would gladly obey it.  
For law, however, the crucial question is whether third-party suggestions can influence 
behavior outside of pure coordination games. Games of pure coordination (such as the choice 
between driving on the left or right or where to meet when lost) are rare. Their rarity probably 
explains why theorists slight the value of coordination to law. But an element of coordination is 
present in common situations that Schelling called “mixed motive” games. In games such as 
Hawk/Dove (discussed below), each player prefers every equilibrium outcome to at least one 
non-equilibrium outcome, but individuals rank the equilibria differently. Thus, there is conflict 
because one individual’s favored equilibrium is another individual’s disfavored equilibrium. But 
there is a shared interest in coordinating to avoid a non-equilibrium outcome. 
With mixed motive games, it is less certain that communication between players will 
facilitate coordination (because each individual may use cheap talk merely to insist upon his or 
her own preferred outcome). Schelling claimed, however, that third-party cheap talk could still 
provide a solution to such games. He offers this example: imagine the effect of a bystander who 
steps into an intersection to direct traffic when the traffic light is broken. Drivers approaching an 
intersection on different roads each want to coordinate to avoid a collision, but each prefers to 
proceed immediately through the intersection while the other waits. Schelling posits that drivers 
will tend to obey the hand signals of the bystander, that is, that this third-party’s expression will 
influence behavior even though, as cheap talk, it does not change the payoffs of the individuals in 
the game.   
B. The Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law 
McAdams (2000a) claims that law is a type of third-party cheap talk capable of 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art29
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constructing a focal point around which individuals then coordinate. Like Schelling’s department 
store sign for lost shoppers, a legal pronouncement “Drive on the left” can, merely by calling 
attention to one equilibrium, cause that outcome to stand out from the other, thus raising the 
probability that individuals will expect others to drive on the left, and thereby inducing everyone 
to drive on the left, all independent of the threat of sanctions. More importantly, McAdams 
claims that third-party cheap talk works not only in pure coordination games, but also in mixed 
motive coordination situations. Here, law works as Schelling’s bystander-in-the-intersection 
directs traffic. By making one outcome salient, legal rules and judgments can guide expectations 
toward that outcome and influence behavior independent of sanctions. Thus, McAdams 
controversially claims that legal expression can, by itself, influence the behavior of parties to a 
dispute. 
The focal point theory then relies on three empirical claims. The first is that the need for 
coordination is pervasive because mixed motive games plausibly model common social conflict. 
The second claim is that, in such games, any third-party expression that calls the players’ 
attention to a particular equilibrium tends to produce that equilibrium. The third claim is that law, 
by publicly endorsing a particular equilibrium, tends to call the players’ attention to that 
outcome. As we explain below, our experiment tests the second of these claims – that salient 
third-party expression influences behavior in these games. In this section, we explain further the 
first and third claims, so as to establish the practical relevance of proving the second. 
Taking the last point first, McAdams (2000a) claims that law frequently creates 
widespread publicity for a particular outcome. Law does not always make a required behavior 
salient, but it often does. We think the claim sufficiently plausible to merit little comment, except 
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to note the parallel to Chwe’s analysis of ritual. The simplest way to create common knowledge 
among a population is a ritual attended by the entire population. But Chwe (2001) identifies 
various mechanisms to create common knowledge among a physically dispersed population. (See 
Chwe 2001, p. 23 (new regime’s units of weights and measures), p. 37-60 (advertising), p. 91-92 
(morning newspaper)). McAdams’ claim is that law often works in the same way. Among the 
many public messages that compete for individuals’ attention, law is typically among the most 
salient. The processes of creating law and adjudicating legal disputes are public and publicized 
rituals that can generate common knowledge (of the government’s expectation of certain 
conduct), making salient the outcome the law prescribes.2  
None of this would matter if the need for coordination were rare. To the contrary, 
however, we contend that much social conflict can be modeled as a mixed motive game 
involving an element of coordination. There are many such games, but we illustrate the general 
point with one example: the Hawk/Dove or Chicken game. Here, each player chooses between an 
aggressive strategy – “Hawk” – where one insists on getting one’s way – and a passive strategy – 
“Dove” – where one defers to others. In a two-person version, the game is Hawk/Dove when 
both players rank the four possible outcomes as follows, starting with the best: (1) playing Hawk 
against Dove; (2) playing Dove against Dove; (3) playing Dove against Hawk; and (4) playing 
Hawk against Hawk. The pure strategy equilibria are Hawk/Dove and Dove/Hawk. Figure 1 
illustrates. Strategy 1 represents Dove and Strategy 2 represents Hawk. 
                                                           
2
 Other types of expression can produce the same effects. Indeed, law competes with non-legal expression with 
varying results. McAdams 2000a notes three reasons law is often more influential than competing expression: law is 
frequently more publicized; the perceived legitimacy of law can make its message “stand out” among other 
messages; and that, because of the first two effects, legal actors may enjoy a reputation for solving coordination 
problems, by having accurately forecasted in past cases which equilibrium would emerge. 
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Figure 1: A Hawk/Dove or Chicken Game 
Hawk/Dove (HD”) models disputes in the following way: When Hawk is played against 
Dove, the player using the aggressive strategy gains a disputed resource and the other player 
receives nothing. When Dove is played against Dove, the players divide the resource or allocate 
it randomly between themselves. When Hawk is played against Hawk, the players “clash” in 
some costly way. The alternative name for the game, “Chicken,” comes from an example where 
teenagers competing for honor drive their cars directly at each other to see who will “chicken 
out”; the outcome of two aggressive strategies is a head-on collision. Schelling’s cross-roads 
example is more common. Drivers approaching an intersection from different roads each prefer 
to proceed first without slowing down, but each realizes that they will collide in the middle if 
neither slows down. 
More generally, a HD game models a dispute if we imagine that the Hawk/Hawk 
outcome represents a physical fight, mutually embarrassing shouting match, or other costly 
conflict. Although the outcome of Hawk/Hawk for each player is uncertain – one might win or 
lose the “fight” – the expected value is the worst possible outcome for both players because the 
cost of fighting is high relative to the value of the disputed resource. This condition is an 
important limitation: when one or more players value the object in dispute highly enough relative 
to the costs of “fighting” (because a player values the object so highly or expects to incur so few 
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costs from fighting), then the game has only one equilibrium and no element of coordination.  
But the condition that fighting be mutually regarded as the worst outcome is plausibly 
satisfied for many disputes. Two neighbors may dispute the precise location of the boundary 
between their land. It is not hard to imagine that, while each desires the disputed sliver of land, 
each recognizes that the result of both insisting on their preference is violence that each expects 
to be more costly than giving in to the preference of the other. Similarly, two individuals sitting 
in a public place may dispute over whether one of them may light a cigarette. Though each 
prefers to get his or her way, we can imagine that each expects that the result of both insisting on 
his or her preference will be a heated row that is worse than giving in to the other. In many 
disputes, the coordination aspect is that both players wish to avoid Hawk/Hawk. But conflict 
remains because the players each prefer to play Hawk to the other’s Dove. 
HD is one of the simplest games of this form,3 but more complex games capture nuances 
omitted from the above examples. For example, a single dispute may involve a number of stages 
of escalating conflict leading up to a final HD game. Or a dispute may involve an indefinite 
number of rounds, each of which is costly for each player, with the winner being the one willing 
to stay in the game the longest. (Regarding this “war of attrition” game, see Fudenburg & Tirole 
1991; Sugden 1986). Or certain disputes may recur among players who recognize each other, so 
that they seek in each round to establish a reputation for playing Hawk in future rounds. The key 
point is that a great many of these games have multiple equilibria where the players mutually 
prefer to avoid outcomes of the most costly conflict. Thus, in various disputes, there remains an 
element of coordination. Because the players’ strategy choice then depends on expectations not 
                                                           
3
 Another simple example is the Battle of the Sexes game. See Baird, Gertner & Picker (1994, p. 41-42, 302).  
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entirely determined by the payoffs, there is room for expressive influence. 
We assume, therefore, that the law frequently addresses mixed situations of coordination 
and conflict, and that law frequently makes one equilibrium in such games salient. Now we turn 
to the final empirical claim: that in these situations, third-party cheap talk (including law) can 
influence behavior merely by making one outcome salient. 
III. THE EFFECT OF EXPRESSION ON COORDINATION: EXISTING LITERATURE 
When Schelling (1960) introduced the idea of focal points, he emphasized that this aspect 
of game theory was inherently empirical, dependent as it is on the shared knowledge and cultural 
understandings of those in the game. As noted above, plenty of research demonstrates that cheap 
talk between the players in a coordination game will influence the players’ behavior. (See Valley, 
et al. 2002; Crawford 1998; Matthews & Postlewaite 1989). More to the point, some experiments 
also establish that third-party expression can influence behavior in certain coordination 
situations. (See Bohnet & Cooter 2001; Brandts & MacLeod 1995; Brandts & Holt 1992; 
Chaudhuri & Graziano 2003; Croson & Marks 2001; Schotter & Sopher 2003; Tyran and Feld 
2002; Van Huyck et al. 1992; Wilson & Rhodes 1997). Yet, for two reasons, the existing 
literature is not entirely adequate to assess whether or how third-party expression influences 
behavior in the type of situations that law addresses. 
The first limitation is the nature of the games employed in existing experiments. As noted 
above, law frequently addresses conflict. There may be no conflict ex ante – prior to a dispute – 
when everyone expects to benefit from an efficient legal rule. But the question of legal 
compliance arises ex post – after a dispute arises – when obeying law involves one party 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
  12 
“winning” and another “losing.” The HD game is useful for modeling such a dispute. But there 
are no existing experiments testing third-party expression in conflict-intensive HD game. Rather 
than games mixing conflict and coordination, most experiments examining the effect of third-
party expression use either pure coordination games, (Wilson & Rhodes 1997, Van Huyck et al. 
1992) (game “A”), or games with symmetrical equilibria where the individuals agree on which 
equilibria is best. (Bohnet & Cooter 2001; Chaudhuri & Graziano 2003; Van Huyck et al. 1992) 
(game “B”). Where other mixed games are used, they are too complex to model legal disputes, 
arising in experiments intended to test abstract theories of equilibrium refinement. (See Brandts 
& McLeod 1995; Brandts & Holt 1992). The one exception is the inter-generational Battle of the 
Sexes game in Schotter & Sopher (2003), which we discuss below. 
The second limitation in existing research is the manner in which the experiments model 
expression. We think it desirable to break down expression into various components, beginning 
with the most minimal, and then to determine the contribution each component makes. In 
particular, the most basic thing expression can do is simply to call attention to a particular 
outcome; so it would be desirable to know whether this “ostensive” feature exhausts the effect of 
expression, or whether other features (discussed below) make an important contribution. Yet all 
existing experiments treat third-party “expression” as an undifferentiated whole.4 
A few studies merit further discussion. Two explicitly aim to study the expressive effect 
of law. Bohnet & Cooter (2001) had subjects play a multi-person game similar to “stag hunt” or 
                                                           
4
 Moreover, in most research, the experimenter merely reads the suggestion to the subjects, increasing the possibility 
of demand characteristics, where subjects comply in an effort to please the experimenter. In the experiment reported 
here, we instead attempt to carefully involve the subjects in the delivery of messages, following Wilson & Rhodes 
1997, Schotter & Sopher 2003, and Tyran & Feld 2002. 
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“assurance,”5 where subjects each choose between strategy “L” and “R.” In the control condition, 
many groups failed to achieve the Pareto-optimal equilibrium, in which everyone plays R. In the 
expressive condition, the payoff for the Pareto-inferior strategy (L) was raised by 20 cents, but 
this change was offset by a 10% probability that anyone playing this strategy would be 
“punished” by 200 cents. Bohnet & Cooter found significantly greater play of the Pareto-optimal 
strategy in this “penalty” condition, even though the expected payoff values of the two strategies 
are exactly the same as the corresponding strategies in the control condition.  
Tyran & Feld (2002) had groups of three subjects play a public goods game. Subjects 
decided whether to contribute to a public good, where withholding (not contributing) always 
generated a higher material payoff for an individual than contributing (no matter what other 
subjects did). In some conditions, subjects voted on a “deduction” rule, knowing that, if a 
majority voted for the rule, the payoffs for withholding would decline by a certain amount. In one 
such condition – “mild law” – the deduction was sufficiently small that an individual would still 
always be materially better off withholding than contributing. Contrary to economic prediction, 
there was some contribution in all conditions. But in the mild law condition, individual 
contributions were three times higher than either the control condition (with no deduction) or a 
condition where the same deduction rule was imposed exogenously, without a vote.  
Both experiments demonstrate the potential for experimentally testing the effect of legal 
expression on behavior. But neither study uses the HD or similar game and neither disaggregates 
the components of expression. First, Bohnet & Cooter (2001) explicitly test expression in a 
                                                           
5
 Baird, Gertner & Picker (1994) define the related games of assurance and stag hunt at pp. 301 & 315, respectively.  
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setting like an assurance game, where all players prefer the same equilibrium.6 Tyran and Feld 
(2002) offer what seems to be a more strenuous test by using a public goods game where the 
material payoffs should compel a single behavior contrary to the expression. But we follow 
Farrell & Rubin (1996, p.113 n.14) in believing that non-material payoffs can change the nature 
of such games. Considerable evidence suggests that, when material payoffs appear to create a 
single equilibrium (such as zero contribution), some individuals cooperate because they directly 
gain utility from reciprocating the other subjects’ strategy and/or producing a “fair” outcome. 
(E.g., Fehr, Fishbacher & Gachter 2002; Heinrich et al. 2001, McCabe, Rassenti & Smith 1998). 
If so, then the total payoffs may create an assurance game; these individuals want to contribute if 
others contribute, but to withhold if others withhold. It is difficult otherwise to explain the 
contributions Tyran & Feld observed. But if some subjects were playing an assurance game, the 
knowledge that a majority voted for a deduction rule would encourage contributions because an 
individual’s vote for the rule suggests an intent to contribute (if one is not going to contribute, 
one is better off without the deduction).  
Consider more precisely why the differences between these games matter. In the 
experiments using the assurance game (or similar games where the players give equilibria the 
same rank), the expression encourages behavior that will, if all players comply, increase the 
expected return of all players.7 This point is true both before and after the players receive the 
message: even after receiving the message, each player prefers complying with the message if 
                                                           
6
 In the game, the players rank the two pure strategy equilibria in the same way. They may fail to reach the Pareto-
optimal outcome (all R) because the associated strategy (R) is riskier (choosing R when most others choose L pays 
less than choosing L when most others pick R).  
7
 Of course, because the recommended strategy is riskier than the alternative, there remains doubt about whether 
everyone else will follow the recommendation, which makes the findings interesting. 
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everyone else does. By contrast, in the HD game, it is only ex ante – before receiving the 
message – that all players are better off if everyone follows whatever message they receive. Ex 
post – after the third party speaks – the situation changes. As in a dispute, the expression will 
identify one player as the “loser,” who plays Dove against Hawk, and is worse off if everyone 
complies. To illustrate, given the Figure 1 payoffs, the mixed strategy equilibrium is for each 
player to choose Hawk or Dove with equal probability. At this equilibrium, the expected payoff 
for either strategy is .5.8 If the players instead correlate their strategies with a random event they 
both observe, like a third party message endorsing one outcome, then they improve their expected 
payoffs to 1.9 But despite this ex ante improvement, once the expression occurs, the “losing” 
player expects a payoff of 0 if both players follow the expression – worse than the mixed strategy 
payoff.10 This sharp ex post conflict in a HD game makes it a better model of legal disputes and a 
more strenuous test of the claim that mere expression can influence behavior. 
The second point about these two experiments (that explicitly aim to study expressive 
law) is that they treat legal expression as an undifferentiated whole. Bohnet & Cooter (2001) 
model legal expression by stating in the experiment instructions that choosing one of the 
strategies (L) “will be punished” with a given probability of 10%, but exactly offsetting the 
expected punishment by a general increase in the payoffs for that strategy. Unfortunately, this 
approach potentially confounds at least two ways in which law may influence expectations: the 
non-normative effect of simply “pointing to” a particular outcome and the normative effect of 
                                                           
8
 At the mixed equilibrium, playing Dove produces a 50% chance of receiving 1 and a 50% chance of receiving 0, 
for a net expectation of .5; playing Hawk produces a 50% chance of 2 and a 50% chance of -1, for a net of .5. 
9
 Everyone following a message based on a coin flip would give each player a 50% chance of earning 2 (playing 
Hawk against Dove) and a 50% chance of earning 0 (playing Dove against Hawk), for a total expectation of 1. 
10
 One might think the loser “knows” the winner will play Hawk, which means the loser necessarily wants to play 
Dove. But the winner might also “know” the loser will want to disregard the disadvantageous third party message. 
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condemning an outcome by labeling part of its payoff a “punishment.” Also, embedding 
normative language in the experiment instructions creates the risk that the behavioral effect 
derives from the subjects’ desire to please the researchers (demand characteristics) rather than the 
ability of legal expression to influence behavior.11 Tyran & Feld (2002) ingeniously use voting in 
their experimental design, which certainly minimizes demand characteristics. But voting itself 
consists of multiple components, including communication and legitimacy, each of which may 
independently contribute to creating a focal point.12 
Finally, Schotter & Sopher (2003) do not seek to study the influence of legal expression, 
but they are the first to study the effects of third-party cheap talk in a game with genuine conflict. 
Each of their subjects plays an inter-generational Battle of the Sexes (BOS) game for one round. 
Players in generation (round) t can offer private, open-ended advice (via a computer screen) to 
their own “successors” in generation (round) t + 1, where each player receives additional payoffs 
based on how well his or her successor does. Schotter & Sopher find that this advice strongly 
influences the players who receive it, despite the fact that the information set of the “parent” is 
“virtually” the same as that of the “child,” and despite the fact that the private advice is not 
common knowledge.  
Though we think the HD game models a dispute more intuitively than the BOS game 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Because the message is cheap talk, the outcome is entirely an empirical question. 
11
 Finally, there is the possibility that Bohnet & Cooter failed to make the penalty “non-deterring” as they suppose. If 
the subjects were risk averse, they would regard the uncertainty associated with the penalty -- a 10% chance at a 200 
cent fine – as worse than the expected loss of 20 cents. If so, the risky payoffs of the experimental condition may 
have driven the results. 
12
 Moreover, voting for a rule may not be the appropriate model of law in a representative democracy, where citizens 
usually vote for a leader who then votes for a rule, rather than voting for the rule itself. Indeed, voting may be merely 
one means of making a leader legitimate, as many law-makers in a democratic society – judges, administrators, etc. – 
are not directly elected.  
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(particularly the inter-generational version), Schotter & Sopher’s study importantly demonstrates 
that cheap talk can influence behavior even in games of conflict. Like other experiments, 
however, they do not disaggregate the components of expression. Their advice combines several 
features at once: it “points to” a strategy, it represents an intentional choice by the advice-giver, 
and that advice-giver presumably enjoys significant legitimacy because his or her payoff structure 
is based on how well the subject does. In addition, Schotter & Sopher did not standardize the 
expression being used, but allowed subjects to send open-ended messages that could include 
reasons for the advice given, which may introduce different expressive features across advice. 
Thus, we are left to wonder which features of the expression were strictly necessary to the result.  
In sum, existing experiments do not test expression in the contexts that best model legal 
disputes, and do not carefully isolate the possibly distinct components of legal expression. Given 
these limitations, there is much to be learned by further study. 
IV. THE EXPERIMENT 
In field studies, it is extremely difficult to isolate possible causes of compliance apart 
from sanctions and legitimacy, much less to identify the particular components of legal 
expression that may influence behavior. Experiments therefore provide a useful starting point for 
systematically examining the influence of legal expression on behavior in coordination 
situations. 
A. Method 
1. Design 
The two crucial parameters for testing the effect of expression are the strategic context 
and the nature of the expression. As to context, we used a Hawk/Dove Game for the reasons 
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explained above. We had the subjects play a series of one-shot HD games based on the payoffs of 
Figure 1, where subjects played no more than once against any other player. As to expression, we 
sought to disaggregate legal expression into its components, so as to isolate the contribution of 
each. We identified three ways that legal expression might make a particular outcome focal: 
ostension, intentionality, and legitimacy. First, at its most minimal level, any relevant expression 
is ostensive; it “points to” and highlights a particular outcome by proclaiming it. Second, 
although non-human devices are capable of “pointing to” a particular outcome, law is also 
intentional -- the product of conscious human decisions. Third, actors who pronounce legal rules, 
at least in a democratic society, tend to enjoy perceived legitimacy. Legitimacy may derive from 
being elected, appointed by others who are elected, or something else. Because each element of 
expression may plausibly contribute to the ability of law to create a focal point, we began with 
the first element – ostension – and then built up towards an approximation of legal expression.13  
We thus contrasted a control condition, where the subjects played the game without 
receiving any expression other than the instructions, with three treatment conditions. In the first 
expressive condition, intended to model the minimalist effects of ostension, the experimenter 
spun a spinner before each round that would “point to” or highlight a particular equilibrium. In 
the second expressive condition, intended to model the added contribution of intentionality, a 
randomly selected subject identified as the “leader” recommended a particular outcome for each 
round. Legitimacy is itself a complex notion with many components. In the third expressive 
condition, intended to model the added contribution of only some minimal level of legitimacy, a 
                                                           
13
 At the same time, we avoided ever using legalistic expressions about rules or penalties. We did this to avoid 
demand characteristics, where the subjects infer from the expression that the experimenter desires them to behave in 
a certain way. In addition, because law enjoys basic legitimacy among our subjects, we wanted to avoid terms that 
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“leader” selected by merit recommended a particular outcome for each round.14 Thus, each source 
of expression adds an additional expressive property to the property introduced by the previous 
source of expression. The experimental design therefore consisted of one factor with four levels, 
as illustrated here: 
Table 1 
Experimental Design 
 
 
Level 
 
Condition 
 
Expressive Component 
 
1 
 
Control  
 
None 
 
2 
 
Spinner  
 
Ostension 
 
3 
 
Random Leader  
 
Intentionality 
 
4 
 
Merit-Based 
Leader  
 
Minimal Legitimacy  
 
2. Procedure.  
In each session 10-14 subjects played about 9 rounds of the HD Game (the exact number 
depended on the number of participants in the session). Subjects were randomly assigned to 
expressive condition based on the session in which they participated.15 Subjects were promised a 
$10 showup fee and informed at the outset that they had the opportunity to earn or lose money, 
depending on their own decisions and the decisions of other participants in the session. Subjects 
were informed only that the session consisted of “a series of decision making periods,” but not 
the actual number. After the experimental instructions were distributed, the experimenter read 
them aloud to ensure that the participants shared common knowledge of the instructions. In each 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
might invoke this legitimacy as a reason to comply. 
14
 We describe this selection process in detail below. 
15
 Two sessions of 10-14 participants were assigned to each of the four treatment conditions. 
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round, participants were randomly paired against an anonymous and different participant and 
were randomly assigned for that round to the role of “R” or “C.” Players were paired against one 
another no more than once. Each counterpart was identified by a randomly assigned number, not 
by name, and the subjects did not know which identification number was associated with which 
player. In addition, the experimenter did not know the name of any subject.  
In each round, player C had to choose between C1 (Dove) or C2 (Hawk); player R chose 
between R1 (Dove) or R2 (Hawk).16 Payoffs were the same as those of Figure 1, where each 
point represented $1. After each round, each subject was informed of the decision of their 
“counterpart.” Any money they earned or lost was added to (or, if negative, subtracted from) their 
$10 showup fee. After the last round of the game, participants completed a questionnaire 
designed to assess their attitudes toward the game and to measure individual characteristics that 
might have influenced their choice of strategy. Final earnings were then computed by summing 
each participant’s payoffs across all rounds. The experimenter then deposited the showup fee 
plus or minus the final earnings into an envelope marked with the participant’s identification 
number, and placed the envelopes on a table. On their way out, each participant approached the 
table one at a time, and picked up the envelope marked with their identification number. 
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 Note that although we use the designations “Hawk” and “Dove” here for purposes of describing the experiment, 
we did not use these terms in any of the participants’ experimental materials. 
Within each session, all subjects were assigned to the same condition. In the control 
condition, the participants played the HD game without expressive influence. In the Spinner 
condition, we used a spinner each round to randomly highlight one equilibrium. The base of the 
spinner was divided into two equal parts, one of which read “R1/C2” and the other of which read 
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“R2/C1.” Before beginning the game, all participants in the Spinner condition were instructed as 
follows: 
Prior to each period, a spinner will be spun in view of everyone. You can see that the spinner will 
either point to “R1/C2” or “R2/C1.” If you wish, you may consider the result of the spin in your 
decision, in whatever manner you choose. You are also entirely free to ignore it.17 
 
In the remaining two expressive conditions, two participants in each session were each 
selected to act as a “leader” for 5 rounds of the game.18 We controlled the message that the leader 
conveyed to ensure that the order of recommendations in the leader conditions exactly matched 
the random order determined by the spinner in the corresponding spinner condition, thus 
minimizing the error variance contributed by differences in order of messages. We kept the 
instructions to the leader confidential, so that the perceived source of the message was the leader 
(rather than the experimenter).  This procedure helped to minimize demand characteristics 
associated with the experimenter being the source of the message. To provide an incentive to 
convey the correct message, leaders were paid according to how many dyads in the session 
followed the message we supplied to them. 
In the Random Leader condition, we explicitly used a random process to select the leader. 
Before beginning the game, the experimenter instructed the subjects as follows: 
You have each been given a ticket when you first arrived at the experiment.  In a moment, we will 
randomly select two ticket numbers from an envelope containing the numbered ticket stubs. Each 
of the two participants whose ticket numbers are selected will be designated the Leader for a 
portion of the session. Prior to each period, the Leader will have the opportunity to write a 
message on the blackboard. If you wish, you may consider the message in your decision, in 
whatever manner you choose. You are also entirely free to ignore it.  
 
In the Merit-Based Leader condition, we attempted to confer some minimal authority on the 
                                                           
17
 Our use of the spinner may bring to mind procedures used in a well-known experiment to demonstrate a cognitive 
heuristic. See Tversky & Kahneman (1982). We discuss the similarities and differences below.  
18
 To control for “actor effects” we assigned two different participants to serve as the leader during each session, one 
for the first half of the session and one for the second half. We analyzed the data to examine whether there were 
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leader by informing participants that they would take a quiz, and that the two participants with 
the highest quiz scores would serve as leaders for the remainder of the session. The remainder of 
the instructions were identical to the above (i.e., they may consider the leader’s message but are 
free to ignore it). The quiz tested participants’ knowledge on a topic they were likely to consider 
of some importance – the results of the state-wide primary election that had recently occurred. 
Prior research suggested that subjects would perceive one’s superior performance on a quiz as 
entitling him or her to a position of authority within the experiment.19 
Participants in the experiment were 103 undergraduate students who participated in 
exchange for a $10 show-up fee. Of these, eight participants served as leaders, and so did not 
play the Hawk/Dove game. On average, subjects earned $7 in addition to the showup fee. The 
experiment lasted approximately one hour. 
3. Hypotheses. The three expressive components of law we tested in this experiment were 
ostension, intentionality, and minimal legitimacy. We hypothesized that each component would 
uniquely contribute to the influence of expression on participants’ choice of strategy, as 
compared to the control. Specifically, we hypothesized: (1) that participants in the treatment 
conditions would be more likely to choose the recommended strategy than those in the control 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
significant differences in compliance based on leader identity; there were none. 
19
 Hoffman & Spitzer (1985) had subjects play a bargaining game in which the subject assigned as the “controller” 
could determine the allocation that would occur if the subjects failed to reach agreement. The method of selecting the 
controller influenced the subjects’ division of the gains from reaching agreement. Assigning the controller to the 
subject who won a simple game, especially with instructions saying this subject had “earned” the position, produced 
a division giving significantly more to the controller, compared to the condition where the assignment was based on 
a coin flip. Similarly, Hoffman, et al. (1994) assigned subjects to a dictator game either randomly or according to a 
general knowledge quiz. Only 20% of randomly selected dictators allocated $0 to their counterpart, but 40% of 
dictators selected by high quiz score allocated $0 to their counterpart. Although these experiments necessarily 
establish only that the person selected by his superior performance will feel entitled to the position to which he or she 
is assigned, we believe it likely that other subjects will also share this view, and therefore that the leader selected by 
merit will be perceived to have some minimal moral authority lacking in the randomly selected leader. 
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(i.e., that expression influences behavior); and (2) that compliance would increase as the message 
source reflected each additional expressive component (i.e., ostension < intentionality < minimal 
legitimacy). 
B. Results 
We designate the strategy indicated by the spinner or the leaders for each round as the 
focal strategy for that round. For convenience, we use the designation “focal strategy” even when 
describing the control condition, where there was no expression to make a strategy focal. Thus, in 
the control, “focal strategy” for round n means the strategy recommended in the expressive 
conditions for round n. We then count an individual player’s strategy choice as “compliance” if it 
corresponds to the focal strategy for that round. Recall that the focal message recommends one of 
two sets of strategies: either that Player R play strategy 1 and Player C play strategy 2, or that 
Player R play strategy 2 and Player C play strategy 1. Because we analyze the data at the level of 
the individual player, we code as compliance the outcome where the individual player's chosen 
strategy matches the focal strategy recommended for that individual (or in the control condition, 
the strategy that would have been recommended had there been a message). 
The mean rate of compliance across expressive treatments is illustrated in Table 2. Note 
that the base rate for compliance in the absence of a message (in the Control condition) is .51, 
meaning that players choose the same strategy as the one that would have been recommended by 
the focal message (even in the absence of that message) about half the time.20 Table 2 also shows 
that the rate of compliance appears to increase with the addition of each expressive component, 
                                                           
20
 There are two possible explanations for why control condition subjects chose the focal strategy 50% of the time in 
the absence of any message. One possibility is that control condition subjects were playing the mixed strategy 
equilibrium for the game (described earlier in section III). Another possibility is that players were not guided by any 
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as operationalized by each level of treatment. This trend appears to support the two hypotheses 
set forth earlier: first, that participants in the treatment conditions are more likely to choose the 
focal strategy than participants in the control condition (i.e., that expression influences 
behavior),21 and second, that compliance increases as the message source reflects each additional 
component.22  
Table 2 
Summary of Data: Compliance Rates Across Treatments and Rounds 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
strategy at all but instead were choosing haphazardly between the two choices. In any case, the important question 
here (which we discuss later) is whether the provision of a message highlighting a particular strategy influences play. 
21
 Recall that, for convenience, we use the designation “focal strategy” even when describing the control condition, 
where there was no expression to make a strategy focal. 
22
 Table 2 also reports rates of compliance within each individual round. Note that there appears to be no upward or 
downward trend in compliance rates over rounds. We test this possibility of learning formally in the next section.  
Variable Mean Compliance Rate 
Control (None) .51 
Spinner (Ostension) .65 
Random Leader (Intentionality)  .74 
Merit-Based Leader (Minimal Legitimacy) .76 
Round 1 .70 
Round 2 .60 
Round 3 .62 
Round 4 .70 
Round 5 .63 
Round 6 .65 
Round 7 .62 
Round 8 .74 
Round 9 .75 
Total .67 
 
1. Hypothesis One (Control v. Treatment). To test whether the addition of expressive 
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components produced statistically reliable increases in compliance rates we estimated a series of 
maximum-likelihood probit regressions. The main analysis of interest was whether the addition 
of each expressive component (operationalized by message source) increased the likelihood of 
compliance. We also tested a model that included dummy variables for each of the rounds of 
play, to examine whether compliance changed over time. Each of these independent variables is 
categorical, and the reported regression coefficients denote the change in the probability that the 
dependent variable changes from 0 to 1 – that is, the change in probability of compliance. The 
reported z-statistic (analogous to the t-statistic in ordinary least squares regression) represents the 
ratio of the probit coefficient to its standard error. 
First, we estimated a probit regression model to test the hypothesis that the players in the 
three treatment conditions (taken together) are more likely to choose the focal strategy than 
players in the control condition. Table 3 indicates that the Treatment variable is statistically 
significant, and the hypothesis that participants in the treatment conditions were more likely to 
choose the focal strategy than participants in the control condition is supported. Receiving a 
message of any kind (whether by spinner, random leader, or legitimate leader) increases the 
probability of choosing the focal strategy by .21, compared to receiving no message.  
Table 3  
Probit Analysis:  
Effect of Focal Message Treatment on Compliance 
 dF/dx Robust SE z P > |z| 
Treatment .212 .040 5.25 
 
.000 
 
N	
	 2 2 = .000; 
dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; z and P > z tests 
whether the probit coefficient is equal to zero. N = 828; standard error is 
adjusted for clustering around subject.   
 
We next examined whether the influence of focal point treatment is robust to whether 
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Hawk or Dove is the recommended strategy. It could be the case that expression influences 
players’ behavior more strongly when recommending that they play Dove, or conversely, more 
strongly when recommending that they play Hawk. We estimated a probit model that included 
both the treatment variable and a dummy variable called “Hawk,” that is assigned the value of 1 
when the focal strategy recommended that the player choose Hawk, and 0 otherwise. Model 1 in 
Table 4 indicates that there was a significant difference in compliance when Hawk was the focal 
strategy, so that players were less inclined to comply when Hawk was recommended compared to 
when Dove was recommended. At the same time, the Treatment variable remains statistically 
significant, so that there is greater likelihood of compliance in the Treatment conditions than 
there is in the control condition, regardless of whether Hawk or Dove was the focal strategy. For 
each of the focal strategies (Hawk and Dove), the message increased compliance compared to the 
control condition.  
Model 2 examines the interaction of Treatment (whether or not there was a message) and 
Hawk (whether the message made Hawk focal or Dove focal). There was no statistically 
significant Treatment x Hawk interaction, suggesting that the magnitude of influence of the 
message in the Treatment conditions did not depend on whether Hawk or Dove was the focal 
strategy. Instead, the message was equally as influential when Hawk was the focal strategy as 
when Dove was the focal strategy – a desirable property for coordination of behavior. Finally, the 
addition of dummy variables for Round in Model 3 allows us to show that the Treatment effect 
remains robust while controlling for any possible effects attributable to round of play, a topic to 
which we return later. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art29
  27 
Table 4 
Probit Analysis: 
Effect of Focal Message Treatment, Message, and Rounds on Compliance 
 
Model 
 
 
DF/dx Robust SE Z P > |z| 
1 Treatment .217 .039 5.46 .000 
 Hawk  -.138 .053 -2.61 .009 
2 Treatment .259 .080 3.26 .001 
 Hawk -.073 .115 -0.64 .524 
 Trtmt x 
Hawk -.088 .132 -0.67 .501 
3 Treatment .263 .082 3.25 .001 
 Hawk -.104 .118 -0.88 .380 
 Trtmt x 
Hawk -.088 .132 -0.67 .500 
 Round 1 .151 .060 2.17 .030 
 Round 2 .068 .070 0.92 .359 
 Round 3 .082 .065 1.20 .229 
 Round 4 .146 .063 2.02 .044 
 Round 5 .094 .063 1.38 .167 
 Round 6 .112 .066 1.54 .123 
 Round 8 .187 .057 2.64 .008 
 Round 9 .196 .056 2.79 .005 
 
Next, we estimated a model that included dummy variables for each of the treatment 
conditions (spinner, random leader, merit-based leader), as well as dummy variables for each of 
the periods of play. This model allows us to separately compare each of the components of 
expressive influence to the control condition. The addition of the dummy variables for Round 
again allows us to examine whether such effects remain robust while controlling for any possible 
effects attributable to round of play. Table 5 indicates statistically significant effects for each of 
the three components of expression that were operationalized in the treatment conditions.  
Compared to the control condition, the probability of choosing the focal strategy increases by .13 
when that strategy is made focal through ostension alone (spinner); the probability increases by 
.21 when that strategy is made focal through ostension and intentionality (random leader); and 
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the probability increases by .23 when that strategy is made focal through ostension, intentionality, 
and minimal legitimacy (merit-based leader).23 
Table 5 
Probit Analysis: 
Effect of Individual Focal Message Treatments and Rounds on Compliance 
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 Note that the dF/dx marginal effects illustrated in Table 5 are very close to differences suggested by the sample 
means in Table 2. For example, Table 2 suggests a .14 increase in probability of playing the focal strategy in the 
spinner condition compared to the control condition, a marginal effect very close to that indicated by the .132 dF/dx 
coefficient for Spinner in Table 5. The marginal effects of Random Leader and Merit-Based Leader shown in Table 
5 are also close to the differences in the respective means depicted in Table 2. These similarities suggest that even 
after controlling for the effects of Round (recall that a few of the coefficients were statistically significant), the 
treatment coefficients (for Spinner, Random Leader, and Merit-Based Leader) remain essentially unchanged. 
Model  dF/dx Robust SE Z P > |z| 
1 Ostension (Spinner) .131 .040 3.08 .002 
 Intentionality (Random Leader)  .209 .045 3.89 .000 
 Minimal Legitimacy (Merit-Based 
Leader) .226 .041 4.72 .000 
2 Ostension (Spinner) .132 .040 3.08 .002 
 Intentionality (Random Leader)  .211 .046 3.86 .000 
 Minimal Legitimacy (Merit-Based 
Leader) .227 .041 4.70 .000 
 Round 1 -.060 .073 -0.84 .400 
 Round 2 -.168 .069 -2.54 .011 
 Round 3 -.145 .081 -1.84 .066 
 Round 4 -.062 .071 -0.90 .369 
 Round 5 -.134 .068 -2.01 .044 
 Round 6 -.109 .074 -1.53 .127 
 Round 7 -.144 .084 -1.76 .079 
 Round 8 -.012 .075 -0.16 .872 
Note: Li	
 	 2!! 2 = .020.  N 
= 828; standard error is adjusted for clustering around subject.   
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2. Round Effects. The model in Table 5 includes dummy variables for individual rounds 
of play.24  The probit coefficients for a few of the individual round dummies are statistically 
significant. In this model, Round 9 is the omitted variable, so that in Rounds 2 and 5 the 
probability of compliance is less than in Round 9. However, there does not seem to be any 
discernible trend of increasing or decreasing probability of compliance across rounds. Most 
important, the treatment dummies are still significant even with the round dummies included in 
the model, indicating that the effect of treatment is robust to any influence of round.  
                                                           
24
 Recall that players played about 9 rounds of the game, each against a different opponent. 
3. Hypothesis Two (Ostention v. Intentionality v. Minimal Legitimacy). We next tested the 
hypothesis that compliance increases as the message source reflects each additional expressive 
component. More specifically, we tested the claim that the probability of choosing the focal 
strategy is higher when that strategy is made focal through intentionality and ostension (random 
leader) than through ostension alone (spinner); and that the probability of choosing the focal 
strategy is higher when it is made focal through minimal legitimacy, intentionality, and ostension 
(merit-based leader) than through ostension alone (spinner) or intentionality and ostension 
(random leader). Tests of equality of the probit coefficients (Table 6) indicate that there was a 
statistically significant difference between spinner and legitimate leader, a marginally significant 
difference between spinner and random leader, and no detectable difference between random 
leader and legitimate leader. The hypothesis that addition of each expressive component 
increases compliance was only partially supported. 
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Table 6 
Focal Message Treatments: Tests for Equality of Probit Coefficients 
 
2(1)  2 
Random Leader "# 
 
2.30 
 
.129 
 
Merit-Based Leader "# 4.11 
 
.043 
 
Merit-Based Leader " 0.07 
 
.791 
 
 
 Finally, we examined players’ attitudes about their counterparts’ strategy choices.  After 
the last round of the game we administered a questionnaire designed to measure attitudes toward 
the game and individual characteristics that might have influenced their choices.25 Participants 
indicated on a 7-point scale their attitudes about the fairness of their opponents’ choices (1= 
extremely unfair; 7 = extremely fair). We found that whenever the counterpart chose the focal 
strategy, this was perceived on average as more fair (M = 5.30) than choosing the non-focal 
strategy (M = 4.54); (t(72) = 3.98; p < .001). We also found that when the counterpart 
disregarded the focal strategy, the magnitude of perceived unfairness depended on whether Hawk 
or Dove was the focal strategy. Specifically, when the focal strategy for the counterpart was Dove 
but the counterpart ignored the message and played Hawk, this was perceived as considerably 
less fair than when the reverse occurred (focal strategy was Hawk and counterpart played 
Dove).26  It appears that playing Dove is perceived as basically fair regardless of the message, but 
                                                           
25None of the individual characteristics we measured predicted choices in the game, so we omit these results for 
purposes of brevity. 
26
 To analyze this question, we first computed a difference score by subtracting fairness of playing Hawk when not 
recommended (1=Extremely Unfair; 7=Extremely Fair) from fairness of playing Hawk when recommended (M = 
1.15). We computed a similar difference score for fairness of playing Dove  (M = 0.36).  We then used a paired t-test 
to analyze whether there was a difference between these two difference scores. The difference was significant. t(72)= 
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playing Hawk is perceived as fair only when authorized by the message.  
C. Discussion 
The results suggest that third-party cheap talk can, by itself, influence the behavior of 
individuals in a HD Game. The results are robust across the recommendation (Hawk or Dove) 
and across round (1-9). That something as arbitrary as a spinner made subjects more likely to 
choose a particular strategy, compared to the control, suggests that expression can influence 
behavior ostensively.27 Merely pointing to an equilibrium appears to increase the salience of that 
choice, which increases the likelihood that players will choose the strategies producing that 
equilibrium. That players are likely to choose a strategy that the spinner obviously selects at 
random suggests that expression influences behavior even when it lacks legitimacy or 
intentionality. Law influences behavior in many ways, but we infer from this result that, at the 
most basic level, law also influences behavior ostensively. That is, in coordination situations, law 
works in part by merely pointing to the prescribed outcome.  
When the source of expression was a leader, there was an additional influence of 
expression on players’ choices, over and above the ostensive influence of the spinner. Although 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
-4.07; p < .001.  
27
 There remains a question of the precise mechanism that produces the behavioral influence. Salience might work 
unreflectively, merely because it causes a certain strategy to be “on the mind” of each subject, or reflectively, 
because it also causes each subject to expect their counterpart to play the salient strategy. These possibilities 
correspond to what Mehta et al. 1994 respectively term as “primary” and “secondary” salience. The well-known 
Anchoring and Adjustment experiment by Tversky & Kahneman 1982 may be interpreted as showing that a random 
device can work via primary salience. They used a “wheel of fortune” displaying numbers to influence the estimates 
subjects made in answering quantitative questions. The random number displayed immediately before subjects gave 
an answer influenced the answer even though it was logically irrelevant. Our experiment does not involve an 
adjustment process by which the subjects understand that the salient choice is incorrect and insufficiently adjust 
away from the incorrect choice. Nonetheless, because expectations about other’s behavior were irrelevant to 
answering the questions posed, the Tversky & Kahneman study suggests that salience can work without affecting 
such expectations. By contrast, Mehta et al. 1994 find that when subjects have an incentive to coordinate, they 
reason about what others will find salient. Thus, in our experiment, it seems likely that the expression works via 
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there was no detectable28 marginal increase in influence of random leader over spinner - mere 
intentionality adding little to ostension in influencing compliance – there was an increase 
between merit-based leader over spinner. Apparently, the process of selecting the leader by a quiz 
on recent political events was sufficient to endow the leader with some minimal form of 
perceived legitimacy, either because the process was deemed more “fair” or the leader was 
perceived as more competent or credible. There was no difference between the random and 
merit-based leader, but it seems plausible that a stronger, more comprehensive manipulation of 
legitimacy than our political quiz might increase compliance considerably, perhaps significantly 
more than a random leader.  
Finally, it is intriguing that subjects so readily came to equate “fairness” with playing the 
recommended strategy, even when the recommendation came arbitrarily from a spinner and 
despite the abstract context of the interaction. We can speculate why. As noted above, all the 
subjects improve their ex ante (but not ex post) payoffs if they all coordinate their strategies with 
a random event they both observe, like the spinner, thereby avoiding the possibility of a 
Hawk/Hawk outcome. We think it possible that many subjects recognized this fact and perceived 
the method for maximizing their joint returns as “fair.” As a result, subjects may have perceived 
as “unfair” the non-compliance that produces or risks the Hawk/Hawk outcome, i.e., where one 
plays Hawk contrary to the third-party message. If so, then the experiment suggests an insight 
into one source of law’s “legitimacy” (even though our primary focus is a compliance 
mechanism other than legitimacy). In situations involving coordination, legitimacy may arise, not 
because law embodies a community’s moral norms, nor because a democratic process produces 
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the law, but because law provides an arbitrary way to coordinate strategies. It is not (or not 
merely) that the law reminds or persuades people of their moral obligations, but that people feel 
obligated in coordination situations to do whatever is, by virtue of its salience, expected of them.  
 
V. CONCLUSION  
In this article, we argue that coordination situations involving conflict frequently occur in 
the real world, and that law can potentially influence behavior in these situations by constructing 
a focal point. As other public rituals generate common knowledge (Chwe 2001), we have 
plausibly assumed that law is frequently capable of drawing attention to the equilibrium outcome 
it prescribes. By publicly announcing a state of affairs (e.g., “No Smoking Here”) law can make 
one of the multiple equilibria salient. We tested whether third-party expression can, by making an 
outcome salient, influence the behavior of the players in the game. In the Hawk-Dove game we 
used, each player preferred a different equilibrium from his counterpart. Yet despite this conflict, 
a third party’s “mere” cheap talk significantly influenced the players’ behavior. Thus, if 
coordination problems of the kind modeled by the Hawk-Dove game are common, and if law 
tends to draw attention to the outcome it prescribes, then law works, in part, by creating a focal 
point. Sanctions and legitimacy do not exhaust the mechanisms by which law influences 
behavior. 
 More specifically, we tested how certain features of cheap talk contribute to its ability to 
influence behavior. Most of the expressive power we discovered exists in the most minimal 
expressive condition we tested: when an explicitly random mechanical device “points to” a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
28
 The apparent marginal increase did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
  34 
symbol of one or another equilibrium. Adding the component of intentionality by having a 
randomly selected leader deliver the message did not reliably enhance the influence of the 
message. But adding a minimal form of legitimacy, by using a merit-based process for selecting 
the leader who delivers the message, did reliably enhance its influence. Finally, we find that 
subjects are quick to equate “fairness” with an individual’s playing Dove when the message so 
indicates. 
 The experiment we report represents only an initial effort to test the focal effects of law. 
Although the experimental setting is highly stylized, the method is highly appropriate for a first 
test of the law’s expressive influence, because it is so difficult in the real world to separate that 
influence from the influence of sanctions and legitimacy. Moreover, the use of experimental 
methods allows us to manipulate precisely the source of influence on behavior (even isolating 
individual components of expressive influences), and therefore to make strong causal inferences 
about the influence of expression on behavior. Nonetheless, our experimental results leave open 
substantial questions for future research. One might test the robustness of the basic findings in 
divergent strategic settings – different games, payoffs, information sets, etc. One could usefully 
test whether ostension works merely through primary (unreflective) salience or because it makes 
players form new expectations about what the other player will do. And it would be productive to 
introduce additional components of legal expression. In particular, one might seek to test whether 
the ostensive influence we identify remains powerful when compared to leaders endowed with a 
stronger form of legitimacy.  
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